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Introduction
For most economists the terms "Chicago economics" and "institutionalism" denote clearly antithetical approaches to the discipline. Members of the modern "Chicago School" such as George Stigler and Ronald Coase have often made highly dismissive remarks concerning American institutionalism. Coase has commented that American institutionalists were antitheoretical, and that "without a theory they had nothing to pass on except a mass of descriptive material waiting for a theory, or a fire" (Coase 1984, p. 230) . Stigler devoted himself to fierce attacks on the work of Gardiner Means, John Kenneth Galbraith, Richard Lester, and of anyone else who ventured to question either the virtues of the free market or the empirical superiority of competitive price theory. Some of these attitudes have their roots in the interwar period, most obviously in Frank Knight's views on the centrality of price theory to any properly "scientific" economics (Knight 1924) , and in his bitingly critical attacks on the policy positions of institutionalist and other advocates of regulatory intervention and of the "social control" of business (Knight 1932) . Nevertheless, what this essay seeks to reveal is a much more complex interrelation between institutional and Chicago economics. To fully understand this relationship it is necessary to begin with the early years of the Chicago Department of Economics.
Chicago Economics and Institutionalism 1892-1919
The Chicago Department of Political Economy was begun in 1892 with Laurence Laughlin as its head. While Laughlin was extremely conservative in his economic and political views, and very much at odds with the historicist or "new" school influence in American economics, he built a department that was extremely diverse in its interests and had significant 3 Ayres switched into philosophy.
It was on Hoxie's recommendation that Laughlin hired Walton Hamilton from Michigan to Chicago in 1913 (Dorfman 1974, p. 6 ). Hamilton only stayed at Chicago until 1915 when he moved to Amherst, but Hoxie and Hamilton became close friends. According to Hamilton, it was Hoxie who first used the term "institutional economist" to describe himself (Hamilton 1916 ). Hamilton later introduced the term into the literature of economics in a paper presented at an American Economic Association meeting in 1918 titled "The Institutional Approach to Economic Theory" (Hamilton 1919 ). The paper is a manifesto for this "institutional" approach to economics. Hamilton argued that anything that "aspired to the name of economic theory" had to be (i) capable of giving unity to economic investigations of many different areas; (ii) relevant to the problem of control; (iii) relate to institutions as both the "changeable elements of economic life and the agencies through which they are to be directed;" (iv) concerned with "process" in the form of institutional change and development; and (v) based on an acceptable theory of human behavior, one in harmony with the "conclusions of modern social psychology." According to Hamilton, among the "leaders" of this move to develop an institutional economic theory were Thorstein Veblen and Wesley Mitchell. Also involved in the same conference session was J. M. Clark who had been hired to Chicago from Amherst by Laughlin in 1915. Clark's doctoral dissertation had been on railway regulation and Laughlin wanted a "railway man" (J. Laurence Laughlin to H. C. Adams, April 7, 1915 , H. C. Adams Papers, Box 10, Folder April 1915) . At this point in his career, however, Clark was attempting to accommodate Veblen's critique of neoclassical economics, and was turning his interest to issues such as social value, economics and psychology, institutional 4 reform, and "social control." His paper at the 1918 conference session was titled "Economic Theory in an Era of Social Readjustment" (Clark 1919) , and complemented Hamilton's paper by arguing for an economics "actively relevant to the issues of its time."
Another member of this group was Harold Moulton. Moulton completed his PhD at Chicago in 1914 under Laughlin, but he also admired Veblen (Dorfman 1959) . He became an assistant professor at Chicago in the same year. Clark, Hamilton, and Moulton co-authored (Rutherford 2002 (Rutherford , 2003 .
It is also worth mentioning that Laughlin and his successor as Head, L. C. Marshall, encouraged women students and that the Department of Political Economy had close connections with the then independent Chicago School of Civics and Philanthropy. Although not usually Breckinridge and Abbott had a major impact on the School of Civics and Philanthropy.
They encouraged their students to take graduate degrees in economics or political science and also worked to restructure the curriculum of the school itself, "emphasizing statistics, empirical research and the scientific method, and making it increasingly like the graduate training in economics, political science and law that they themselves had received" (Hammond 2000b, p. 84) . They produced a remarkable stream of empirical research and worked to make the School a part of the University, which they succeeded in doing in 1920 with the establishment of the Graduate School of Social Service Administration.
Chicago Economics and Institutionalism in the 1920s and 30s
The interwar period is sometimes seen as a period in which the "first Chicago School" was formed. The usual presentation of this first Chicago School tends to focus on Jacob Viner, Frank Knight, and Henry Simons (Millar 1962 (Reder 1982, p. 6-7) .
Nevertheless, throughout much of the interwar period the Department remained very much a "mixed bag" (Reder 1982, pp. 2-3 (Clark 1926 ) which detailed numerous types of market failures and the need for regulation of business. The Department also contained Leon C. Marshall in commerce, Chester Wright in economic history, Harry Millis in labor economics, and James Field in population economics who were all as much institutionalist as anything else. Field taught a course on standards of living, and in the early 1920s Marshall, Wright, and Field all worked on an experiment to develop a "case and problem presentation of economics" to supplement, and even substitute for, more traditional texts (Neill 1972, p. 27) .
Paul Douglas was hired in 1920, and Douglas combined neoclassical and institutional approaches. His work included important empirical applications of neoclassical theory, a broad interest in labor issues, and a reform sensibility more in line with the institutionalists (Reder 1982, p.3) . Douglas also championed underconsumptionist ideas and led the effort to have (Mitchell 1912) , that the "business man's calculation of profit and loss cannot be transferred to a field not controlled by pecuniary standards" (Kyrk 1923, p. 144 ).
Thus, the key idea is that consumption patterns relate to habitual "standards of living." Kyrk undertook to measure and critically analyze existing standards of living, and to create policy to help achieve higher standards of living. In her later work Kyrk discussed the household in both its producing and consuming roles, the division of labor between the sexes, employment and earnings of women, adequacy of family incomes, and issues of risks of disability, unemployment, provision for the future, social security, and the protection and education of the consumer (Dorfman 1959, pp.570-578; Hirschfeld 1998; Beller and Kiss 2001, 2003) . Helen Wright was encouraged to pursue her PhD in economics after studying with Breckinridge and Abbott in the Hamilton, and co-authored two books on the American bituminous coal industry with Hamilton Wright 1925, 1928) . The Brookings Graduate School had a strongly institutionalist orientation (Rutherford 2003) . When the School disappeared in the merger that Some criticisms of institutionalism did begin to emerge from Chicago from about the late 1920s onward but these lines of attack did not come from a consistent point of view. In 1928 Henry Schultz complained that "some economists, among whom are to be included not a few members of the institutional school, have, unfortunately, gotten the impression that any attempt to derive a law of demand must needs be based on no better psychology than that of James Mill.
A few of them go so far as to deny the existence of the law of demand" (Schultz 1928, p. 95 ).
Schultz was to continue his critique of the institutionalists approach to empirical work in a sharp rebuke to the work of the Wisconsin Tariff Research Committee, a Committee that included J. R.
Commons and Walter Morton (Schultz 1935) , and in a public lecture given in 1937 that was explicitly critical of Mitchell's quantitative methods (Schultz 1937) . In a 1928 AEA roundtable on quantitative methods, Viner (1928) defended qualitative neoclassical theory and expressed concerns about the applicability of natural science methods to economics. This contribution is clearly a response to Mitchell's view that quantitative work would lead to a very different kind of economics focused on quantitative measurement and empirically testable propositions (Mitchell 1925 ). Knight pursued a more radical line of attack, being altogether critical of the scientism of those who espoused quantitative and empirical methods. Knight also attacked the behaviorism of institutionalists such as Copeland, and the policy interventionism of those such as Sumner Slichter (Knight 1924 (Knight , 1932 ). Knight's criticisms were not limited to institutionalists, however, and he was hostile to both Schultz and Douglas (Reder 1982, p. 6) . It is worth noting here that In 1935 the hostility between Knight and Douglas spilled over into the issue of the continued appointment of Simons and Director. Both had extremely poor publication records and the Department, with the sole exception of Knight, was opposed to reappointing them. Nevertheless Knight accused Douglas of conducting a personal vendetta against him and of being motivated Simons' further proposal that the regulation of natural monopolies should be replaced by public ownership was endorsed by institutionalists concerned with regulation issues, such as Columbia's James Bonbright.
It is also the case that over much of this period one would be hard put to distinguish the doctoral dissertations being produced at Chicago from those at Columbia. Theodore Yntema (a Viner/Schultz student) stands out as having a theoretical dissertation, but many seem quite institutional. Hazel Kirk passed on her anti-neoclassical views to her student Margaret Reid, 
Knight and Institutional Economics
In a recent article, Geoff Hodgson, argues that Knight should be classified as an institutional economist, although a "maverick" institutionalist (Hodgson 2001 , but see Emmett 1999a , 1999b ). Hodgson's argument is based largely on Knight's views on the limits to price theory, his deep interest in issues of institutional change and what he called "historical sociology," his teaching of a course on "Economics from an Institutional Standpoint," and his admiration for the work of Max Weber. Indeed, Knight had arrived in Chicago with the expectation of teaching in institutional economics and not in economic theory (Emmett 1999b) .
He knew the work of institutionalists such as Veblen, Commons, Mitchell, Copeland and Ayres extremely well. He also had a close personal friendship with Clarence Ayres, and corresponded frequently not only with Ayes, but also with other institutionalists such as Morris Copeland and Max Handman on issues including valuation, behaviorism, economic history, and the treatment of consumption. Knight's concern with valuation and consumption issues also led him to read and critique Hazel Kyrk's instrumental theory of valuation contained in her Theory of Consumption (Frank Knight Papers Box 36, Folder 22) . In addition, Knight greatly encouraged Abram Harris's work on the interpretation of Veblen, Marx, and institutional economics (Harris 1932 (Harris ,1934 . Nevertheless, Knight subjected the ideas of the institutionalists to sustained criticism, attacked all varieties of "scientism," held a deeply distrustful view of political processes (and of those who sought political position or influence), and consistently maintained the central importance of standard price theory in any economic analysis, whether theoretical or historical in nature. These aspects of this thinking separate him from the members of the institutionalist movement in vital respects.
For Knight, economic theory deals with the problem of rational choice, of using given means to achieve given ends, or the sphere of "economizing" behavior. Economic theory of this type is highly abstract and general: "There are no laws regarding the content of economic behaviour, but there are laws universally valid as to its form. There is an abstract rationale of all conduct which is rational at all, and a rationale of all social relations arising through the organization of rational activity" (Knight 1924, p. 135) . These general laws, in Knight's view, are not institutional or historically relative. Institutions "supply much of their content and furnish the machinery by which they work themselves out, more or less quickly and completely, in different actual situations," but the "general laws of choice among competing motives or goods are not institutional" (Knight 1924, p. 137) . For Knight, specific content came from the application of economic theory to particular historical situations, where resources, technology, institutions, social values and norms could be taken as given, but the theory itself was to be understood as an ideal type, both abstract and general.
The broader task of understanding the changing institutions, social values and norms was the subject matter of institutional economics or of historical sociology. These issues, and However, even in this context he argued that a proper understanding of the principles of the price theory was absolutely central. In his review of Sombart's Modern Capitalism, Knight complained that its "most striking feature . . . is the author's failure to understand the elementary mechanics of the competitive economic organization" (Knight 1928, p. 90 ), a complaint he extended to most historians and institutional economists. Of the American institutionalists, his most generous comments concerned Commons's work, work that he regarded as hopelessly unsystematic but highly "suggestive and valuable" (Knight 1935 ). Weber he admired on the grounds that "he is the only one who really deals with the problem of causes or approaches the material from that angle that can alone yield an answer to such questions, that is, the angle of comparative history in the broad sense" (Knight 1928, p.101-102) . In Knight's view both legal developments and the religious element stressed by Weber were major factors in the development of capitalism. In particular, he pointed to the "change in the content of the property concept, its differentiation into numerous forms, and the liberation of both men and things from the prescription of authority and tradition," the development of rationality, science, and of deliberative action, and the constructive rather than purely acquisitive nature that the "spirit of enterprise" gained under capitalism (Knight 1928) . All the same, from the various outlines and course notes available it appears that while Knight provided an extremely informed discussion of many episodes in economic history, and both presented and critiqued a wide variety of treatments of institutions and institutional change, he did not succeed in providing a complete or well articulated treatment of his own views on institutional change.
Knight taught his course on "Economics from an Institutional Standpoint" from the early 1930s through to at least 1942, but the course was not always offered. There is also mention of his teaching a seminar on Max Weber, a seminar attended by both Friedman and Stigler (Leeson 2000, p. 57) . However, what most students took from Knight seems not to have been his concerns with issues of long term institutional change, but his views of the central importance of price theory and of competitive markets. Knight's own work included both the "as if" approach to the theory of rational choice, and the claim that the problem of monopoly and monopolistic competition was much overstated. Related to this was his generally positive appraisal of the competitive price system, at least as compared with any alternative political processes, and his classical liberal philosophy and set of values. These ideas became an important part of the later "Chicago View" and were communicated to students through Knight's introductory course material, later published as The Economic Organization (Knight 1951) , as well as through his courses on theory and on the history of economic thought, the latter concentrating on Adam Smith. Among his students, Knight's concerns about the limits to price theory, and the problems created by changing social values, seem to have been largely ignored or dismissed (Stigler and Becker 1977) . Schultz's at Iowa State, during which time she had written her Economics of Household Production (Reid 1934) . Schultz also had an interest in the economics of the household and was keen to add her to the faculty to continue her empirical work on household and consumer 17 behavior.
Chicago Economics and Institutionalism after 1940
Many changes occurred in the Chicago
As indicated above, the mid-1930s saw the development of a small group of Knight's students who were beginning to function "in a loosely coordinated fashion to advance their common ideas" (Reder 1982, p. 7) . By 1945 the dominant position of Keynesian and imperfect competition theories in the profession led Simons to make proposals to preserve "at least one place where some political economists of the future may be thoroughly and competently trained along traditional-liberal lines" (Coase 1993 ). Simons was pessimistic about the prospects, but the "the key to the development and eventual dominance of the 'Chicago View'" in the post World War II period was the uniting of Friedman, Stigler, and Wallis on the Chicago faculty (Reder 1982, p. 10) . Friedman took the leadership in promoting the Chicago View, particularly in his price theory course, his work on macroeconomic and monetary economics, and his methodological viewpoint. Friedman's main targets were Keynesian economics, the work of those associated with Cowles, and the imperfect competition theories of Edward Chamberlin and Joan Robinson. Stigler also mounted many attacks, "Demolition Derbies" to use Thomas Sowell's phrase (Sowell 1993) , on monopolistic competition theory (Leeson 2000) , on Paul Sweezy's kinked demand curve (Stigler 1947a) , on Harvey Leibenstein's X-efficiency concept (Stigler 1976; Freedman 2002) , on Richard Lester's challenge to marginalism based on a survey of business decision making (Stigler 1947b) , and on institutionalist writing such as Gardiner Means work on administered prices (Stigler and Kindahl 1970) , J. K. Galbraith on countervailing power (Stigler 1954) , and Berle and Means on corporate ownership and behavior (Stigler and Friedland 1983b) . Stigler was openly contemptuous of institutionalist work, saying: "Institutional economics is dying out at a fantastic rate-though still not fast enough to suit me" (Sowell 1993, p. 788) .
Chicago economics, however, became much more than a combination of traditional competitive price theory and monetarism, spreading itself into a variety of new areas. The Chicago View, with its strong pro-market, anti-regulatory, emphasis became the basis of Chicago law and economics. Simons' teaching in the law school had begun this trend, but it was with An additional, and fascinating, institutionalist-Chicago connection runs through Rutledge Vining. Vining graduated from Chicago in 1944 with a thesis on regional variation of short run business cycles, but he had also been taught by Frank Knight. Vining became an research associate at the National Bureau and it was Vining who wrote the reply to Koopmans, defending the Burns/Mitchell approach to business cycles (Vining 1949) . His NBER experience gave him an interest in the institutionalist conception of a "price system" or "economic system" that underlay much of the empirical work of institutionalists such as Mitchell, F. C. Mills, but which had never been made explicit (Rutledge Vining to Arthur Burns, June 10 and October 9, 1963, Arthur F. Burns Papers, Box 35, Folder Vining (2) ). Vining sought to make a "simple peace" between statistical economists and the methodological writings of Knight. For Vining quantitative economics was not about solving social problems but about "the behavior properties of population systems" (Vining 1950) . Such systems can be thought of as consisting of individuals acting within a set of "laws" or rules that are largely institutional in nature. Such laws he though of as stochastic in nature, producing variations in outcomes. From this he 21 developed a concern with the problem of "diagnosing faultiness in the observed performance of an economic system" (Vining 1963 ) and an emphasis on ensuring that policy did not merely attack symptoms but operated on the level of the underlying rules or structure of the system. In Vining's view the policy maker's job was to choose the rules rather than to try to directly regulate outcomes. Vining spent his career at the University of Virginia (from 1945) and recruited Buchanan and Nutter there. For many years Buchanan and Vining were close, and Vining's emphasis on the underlying institutional rules was a vital factor in the development of Buchanan's own thinking, as Buchanan himself has often acknowledged (Buchanan and Tullock 1965, p. 210) . Chicago in 1951, and it was while he was at Chicago that he made many of his major contributions to the formulation of the Uniform Commercial Code. Llewellyn's argument concerning commercial law is relevant in that he claimed that the courts tended to enforce the norms of prevailing commercial practice, including the obligation of "good faith" or the 22 observance of "reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade" (Leiter 2001) . A similar view was expressed by Commons. Schwartz (2000) has argued that this anticipated the more recent law and economics position concerning the efficiency of common law. Efficiency is "an important norm of mercantile practice," thus if judges enforce these norms "it will turn out that judges will try, among other things, to produce efficient outcomes" (Leiter 2001 ).
Posner and others have denied that Chicago law and economics owes anything directly to the legal realist movement, and this is a controversial topic (Posner 1995) . Posner himself frequently cites Justice Holmes' sociological jurisprudence and refers often to John Dewy's pragmatism, both of which were sources for the more sociological end of the realist movement.
On the other hand, it should not be surprising that Llewellyn himself did not entirely approve of the particular type of neoclassical law and economics being developed by Director and others at Chicago (Kitch 1983) . For Llewellyn (and for Commons) efficiency was only one consideration taken into account by judges in reaching their opinion of "reasonable standards." As with other Chicago work we find here an older institutionalist theme being reworked and modified through the application of neoclassical price theory.
Conclusion
If the term institutional economics is defined broadly enough (to encompass any approach with a central concern with economic institutions) then there is a sense in which Chicago economics has always been institutional. The particular expression of this interest in institutions has, however, varied significantly. Initially, Chicago was the home of the American institutional economics of Veblen, Mitchell, Hoxie, Hamilton, Kyrk, and others of similar viewpoint and this 23 type of institutionalism persisted at Chicago much later than usually thought-well into the 1920s.
Slightly later in the interwar period, Knight pursued his own attempt to develop the "institutional standpoint" in order to deal with those factors taken as given by standard price theory. This attempt was explicitly in reaction to, and critical of, the previous work by those associated with American institutionalism, and Knight drew most inspiration from the work of Max Weber.
Knight's influence on later Chicago economics seems to have run more in terms of his commitment to the importance of price theory and his liberal philosophy than in terms of his particular treatment of institutions. Knight's students transformed this into a more general Chicago concern with the defence of the market and of liberal values, and related criticisms of government regulation and macro policy intervention. The work undertaken to develop these concerns, as well as the long Chicago tradition in consumption and household economics, seems eventually to have led to a renewed interest in the functioning of various economic, social, legal, and political institutions, but this time from an essentially neoclassical standpoint. This "neoclassicalization" of older institutionalist themes was very much a trademark of the Chicago economics of the 1960s and 70s.
